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EARTHQUAKE INSURANCE: A PROPOSAL FOR
COMPULSORY COVERAGE
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 1985, a new law requiring insurance companies
to offer earthquake insurance went into effect.' The new law pro-
vides that no policy of residential property insurance may be issued,
delivered, or initially renewed in California unless the named in-
sured is offered coverage for loss or damage caused by the peril of an
earthquake. Failure to accept the offer within a thirty-day period
creates a conclusive presumption that the insured has elected not to
accept the coverage, and the insurance company is not required by
the new law to repeat the offer.
The legislative objective, as set forth in the statute, is two-fold.
The first objective is to promote awareness of earthquake insurance.
At present, only five to seven percent of California homeowners
carry earthquake insurance.' The second objective is to preclude re-
covery for loss caused by or resulting from an earthquake unless the
policy specifically indemnifies against the risk of earthquake loss.'
The statute provides that in the absence of an endorsement or an
additional policy provision specifically covering the peril of earth-
quake, no policy
shall provide, or shall be held to provide coverage for any loss or
damage when earthquake is a proximate cause regardless of
whether the loss or damage also directly or indirectly results
from, or is contributed to, concurrently or in any sequence by
any other proximate or remote cause, whether or not covered by
the policy. (emphasis added)."
The underlying purpose of the legislation is to reduce the potential
for insolvency faced by insurance companies, as a result of recent
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1. CAL. INS. CODE, adding Chapter 8.5 (commencing with § 10081) to Part I of Divi-
sion 2 of the Insurance Code (Stat. 1984, Ch. 916, at 46).
2. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS PROJECT, EARTHQUAKE IN-
SURANCE: A PUBLIC POLICY DILEMMA (Final Draft) (Aug, 1983). (A Cooperative State/
Federal Action-Planning Project by the California Seismic Safety Commission and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)) [hereinafter cited as SCEPP.
3. CAL. INS. CODE § 10088 (West Supp. 1985).
4. Id.
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court decisions5 which have expanded insurance company liability by
the doctrine of concurrent proximate cause.' Under this doctrine, the
named insured can recover for losses resulting from natural
peril-even when the policy specifically excludes such coverage-if a
proximate cause of the loss was covered under the insured's "all-
risk" policy. The burden of proof is on the insurer to demonstrate
that no proximate cause of the damage is covered.7 Of further con-
cern to the insurance industry is the threat of extensive punitive
damages for bad faith failure to settle.8
Since insurance companies could ultimately be liable for billions
of dollars in claims in the event of a significant earthquake in a ma-
jor metropolitan area,9 the insurance industry sponsored a series of
legislative proposals that eventually resulted in the passage of A.B.
2865.'0 This new law purports to preclude application of the well-
settled doctrine of concurrent causation to earthquake-related casu-
alty claims: the issue thus arises whether the courts will reverse their
5. See infra notes 58, 62, 66, 70 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 62 and accompanying text. The concurrent proximate causation doc-
trine, as applied in Partridge, infra note 62, allows an insured to recover for losses resulting
from an excluded (uninsured) peril if a covered peril was a concurrent proximate cause of the
loss.
7. R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 270-73 (1971); see generally SCEPP,
supra note 2, at 4. Under an "all-risk" policy, all perils within a particular category are
covered unless otherwise excluded. CAL. INS. CODE § 102(a) (West 1976) defines "fire insur-
ance" to include "Insurance against loss by fire, lightning, windstorm, tornado, or earth-
quake." Although policies differ, common exclusions include such perils as loss due to enemy
attack or invasion, rebellion, war, ordinance or law, nuclear hazards, neglect, earth movement,
and flood. It should be pointed out, however, that coverage for some of these excluded perils
may be purchased separately, but for relatively higher premiums.
8. In Garvey v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 1CIV A017878, Ct. of Appeal, 1st Dist.,
a San Francisco Superior Court jury assessed $35,000 in compensatory damages and
51,000,000 in punitive damages against State Farm for refusing to settle a claim by Marin
County man, Jack Garvey, who lost part of his home due to earth movement. State Farm is
appealing the decision. See also Insurance Unfair Claims Practices Act, CAL. INS. CODE §
790.03 (West 1972 & Supp. 1985).
9. One source estimates that an 8.3 earthquake in the Los Angeles area would result in
the loss of between 15,000 and 69,000 lives, and upwards of $50 billion in damages, depend-
ing on the location of the epicenter and the time of day. SCEPP, supra note 2, at 1; see also
K. STEINBRUGGE, EARTHQUAKES, VOLCANOES, AND TSUNAMIS, AN ANATOMY OF HAZARDS
at 220-28, 294-95 (1982) (The 1906 San Francisco earthquake had a magnitude of 8.3 on the
Richter scale, and resulted in over 700 deaths). Id.; see also COMMISSIONER'S REPORT, CALI-
FORNIA DEPT. OF INSURANCE, CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE ZONING AND PROBABLE MAXI-
MUM Loss EVALUATION PROGRAM (1983) (There have been four editions of this report, here-
inafter cited as the CEZ/PMLE Program Report (Year)). Although individual insurance
companies cover themselves by purchasing "reinsurance" from other companies, the effect of
several companies simultaneously exceeding their surpluses would have a devastating effect on
the insurance industry.
10. See supra note 1.
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trend and give the new statute the strict interpretation desired by its
sponsors.
This comment will review the new statute, and discuss why its
approach is inconsistent with its intended objectives. A more effective
approach is required, one that would provide coverage, while at the
same time minimize the adverse elements of uncertainty and poten-
tial insolvency. Therefore, this comment proposes an alternative sys-
tem based on a theory of compulsory earthquake insurance.
In order to appreciate the significance of this recent statute and
to gain a useful perspective when weighing the various factors, it is
important that the reader understand the development of the concur-
rent cause doctrine, the unique rules of construction applied to insur-
ance policy interpretation, and the crucial role of insurance in the
disaster recovery process.
Therefore, Part II of this comment will describe the crucial role
of casualty insurance and its relationship to risk distribution and loss
allocation in the disaster recovery process. Part III will review the
development of the doctrine of concurrent cause, and its application
to casualty insurance policies. Part IV will discuss some of the
unique aspects of insurance policy interpretation and highlight some
potential areas of conflict with the new law. Finally, Part V will
describe and propose an alternative approach to the underlying prob-
lem of how best to distribute the risk and to allocate the potential
loss resulting from, or caused by earthquakes. In contrast to the
"mandatory offer" approach set forth in the new addition to the In-
surance Code, this comment proposes a program of compulsory
earthquake insurance for all California property owners.
II. THE ROLE OF INSURANCE IN DISASTER RECOVERY
A. The Coalinga Earthquake
The 1983 Coalinga earthquake' presented a dramatic example
11. Low, Coalinga Quake Causes Tremors in Insurance Law, L.A. Daily J., Aug. 1,
1983, at 1, col. 6. On May 2, 1983, an earthquake measuring 6.5 on the Richter Scale struck
the central valley town of Coalinga, Cal. which has 7,000 residents. As a result, 47 people
were injured, over 500 buildings were damaged, and total costs were estimated at $31 million.
Perlman, Coalinga Quake Mysteries Indicate Hidden Hazards, S.F. Chronicle, Dec. 6, 1983,
at 1, col. 5. Earthquake magnitude, or the amount of energy released by an earthquake, was
originally defined by Professor Charles F. Richter of the California Institute of Technology in
Pasadena in 1935. Measurements are made with a seismograph, hypothetically located at a
point 62 miles (100 kilometers) from the center of surface energy release (epicenter). The
Richter Scale is logarithmic, with each whole number representing a magnitude of energy
approximately 31.5 times the lower number. Therefore, the 1964 Alaska earthquake, which
measured 8.5, released almost 1000 times as much energy as the earthquake in Coalinga, at
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of the role of casualty insurance in the event of a natural disaster. At
the same time, however, it generated considerable anxiety within the
insurance industry over the issue of potential industry insolvency.12
Concerned about the adverse ruling in Garvey v. State Farm the
previous year,'" the various insurance companies paid out on ap-
proximately seventy percent of the claims that resulted from the
Coalinga earthquake, although only a few Coalinga residents actu-
ally carried earthquake insurance."'
Given the relatively moderate magnitude of the Coalinga
tremor, along with the relatively low population and density of the
area, the unprecedented number of claim settlements made it appar-
ent that a major earthquake in a large, heavily populated metropoli-
tan area such as Los Angeles or San Francisco might force insurance
companies to become liable for claims in excess of available
reserves." The new provisions of the Insurance Code would theoret-
ically eliminate this dilemma by ensuring that losses would only be
recoverable if premiums for earthquake coverage had been
collected.'"
The suitability of insurance as a risk distribution and loss allo-
cation mechanism is clearly demonstrated by comparing casualty in-
surance to other sources of disaster relief, such as federal disaster
relief loans. It should be noted that federal disaster relief loans are
just that-loans for which the borrower must qualify. Moreover,
6.5: (31.5 x 31.5 = 992.25) P. YANEV, PEACE OF MIND IN EARTHQUAKE COUNTY 38-42
(1980).
12. See supra note 9.
13. See supra note 8.
14. L.A. Daily J., August 18, 1983, at 2, col. 2. As a result, insurance companies paid
approximately $13,000,000 in earthquake losses. By comparison, according to one study, total
California earthquake losses paid between 1916 and 1981 came to only $13,997,540. Between
1962 and 1981, earthquake premiums earned amounted to $277,787,896, compared to losses
paid of $9,270,558, for a payout ratio of 3.34%. K. STEINBRUGGE, supra note 9, at 190
(Steinbrugge cautions, however, that these figures are often incomplete, inaccurate, and incon-
sistent). Although earthquake premiums earned in 1982 reached a record $58,877,000 (with
negligible losses paid in that year), the most recent estimates of probable maximum insured
loss were $3.94 billion for the San Francisco Bay area (Zone A), and $5.48 billion for the Los
Angeles-Orange County area (Zone B). Telephone interview with Richard Roth, California
Department of Insurance, Los Angeles office (Mar. 1, 1984). These figures were published in
the February, 1984 edition of the CEZ/PMLE Program Report, supra note 9; see infra note
125 and accompanying text for an explanation of earthquake PML zones.
15. CEZ/PMLE Program Report (1984), supra note 9, notes that the capacity of the
insurance industry for an earthquake catastrophe is a "matter of opinion." According to the
Report, in 1982 the insurance industry took in $118 billion in premiums and investment in-
come, and paid out $113 billion in losses, expenses, and policyholder dividends. At year end
1982, the industry had a surplus of $60 billion. Id.at 24.
16. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
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they are available only in limited amounts, and must be repaid at
specific rates of interest which are based on the ability to pay."7 Al-
though the loan limits have been raised and the interest rates have
been lowered since Coalinga, the percentage of applicants who actu-
ally qualify for such loans continues to be extremely low.18 Depend-
ing on the circumstances, casualty insurance may be the only source
of recovery funds available to many homeowners and tenants.
Therefore, it is clearly in the public interest to provide the in-
surance companies with some protection against insolvency which is
brought on by indiscriminate application of the concurrent cause
doctrine. At the same time, however, it is necessary to take steps to
distribute the risk of disaster losses so that the burden is shared
equally.
B. The All-Risk Homeowner's Policy
In order to better comprehend the impact of the new provisions
of the insurance code on present casualty insurance practices, the
reader should have a basic understanding of all-risk policies and
their application to disasters such as earthquakes.
Generally, homeowners are insured under an "all-risk" policy' 9
that covers all risks from physical loss, subject to certain exceptions
17. Federal disaster relief loans are administered by the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency (FEMA) and the Small Business Administration (SBA). Eligibility is based on
ability to pay, as determined by the SBA. There are three categories of disaster loans: physical
damage to homes, physical damage to businesses, and business economic loss (where the physi-
cal business itself is not damaged, but the disaster halts sales and other business activity). In
the home and business categories, two types of interest rates are charged, depending on
whether or not the applicant could qualify for a loan elsewhere (as determined by the SBA). If
an applicant can demonstrate financial need, he or she may qualify for a grant. Even if an
applicant qualifies for a loan or a grant, there are limits on the amounts. A homeowner may
borrow up to a total of $55,000 for real and personal property; grants are limited to $5,000,
and are only available if a disaster is officially declared. In addition, only a small percentage of
applicants qualify for these loans. For example, in Coalinga, only 13% of the homeowners
who were initially interviewed received loans, and the interest rates ranged from 55A to 11 A%,
depending on eligibility for other loans. Telephone interview with Small Business Administra-
tion, Sacramento office (Feb. 2, 1984).
18. According to the Small Business Administration, homeowners may obtain personal
property loans up to $20,000 and real property loans up to $100,000. If the SBA determines
that the homeowner would qualify elsewhere for a non-government loan, the interest rate is
8%. Otherwise, the rate is 4%. Loan maturity is based on ability to repay, but may not exceed
30 years. According to an SBA Disaster Activity Report, out of 355 interviews conducted
pursuant to the April 24, 1984 Morgan Hill earthquake, only 26 applications were accepted
for processing. Out of these, only two were approved. Letter and accompanying information
provided by Small Business Administration, Sacramento office (May 16, 1984) (copy on file at
the University of Santa Clara Law Review office).
19. See supra note 7.
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or exclusions. All-risk policies are distinguishable from the less com-
mon "specified peril" policies, which only cover the policy holder for
certain perils specified in the policy. The advantage of the all-risk
policy to the insured is that there are fewer gaps in the coverage and,
perhaps more significantly, the burden of proof is on the insurer to
prove that a particular loss was not covered by the policy.20
Consequently, insurers insert exclusionary clauses in the stan-
dard all-risk policy in order to exclude coverage for losses due to
certain events or perils (e.g., earthquakes, mudslides, floods, etc.).
The insurer can then offer additional coverage for these perils by
means of endorsements or riders attached to the standard policy.2
This permits the homeowner the option of purchasing additional
coverage, and theoretically results in a correlation between the de-
gree of risk insured and the amount of premiums collected.
There are a number of drawbacks to this approach of providing
an all-risk policy which purports to cover everything not otherwise
excluded, then adding coverage for specific perils through riders or
endorsements. First of all, the policy itself becomes difficult to under-
stand. Policyholders are generally unaware of the specifics of their
actual coverage until after a disaster strikes. Second, as indicated by
the low percentage of homeowners who carry earthquake insurance,
providing optional coverage creates a situation in which the home-
owner must speculate, based on inadequate or inaccurate informa-
tion, on the probabilities of loss and the necessity for such coverage.
Despite the fact that earthquakes are known to have occurred for
thousands of years, the California Department of Insurance only be-
gan to publish statistical probabilities of loss in 1981.22 Therefore,
20. Strubble v. United Services Automobile Ass'n, 35 Cal. App. 3d 498, 110 Cal. Rptr.
828 (1973) (holding that insurer had burden of showing that loss to insureds was proximately
caused by the excluded peril of earth movement other than earthquake, an included peril).
21. Earthquake insurance is typically written as an endorsement to the standard com-
prehensive homeowner's policy, and is subject to a deductible that ranges from 5-15%, depend-
ing on the type of home construction. Rates are calculated on the aggregate probable maxi-
mum loss (PML), which is based on, among other factors, the location of the structure and its
proximity to a known or suspected earthquake fault zone, the type of building, and costs of
repair and replacement. A typical premium for a $100,000 home in the Santa Clara Valley
would be approximately $165-200 per year, with a $5,000 deductible. For an excellent and
thorough discussion of rates, deductibles and PML calculations, see K. STEINBRUGGE, Supra
note 9, chs. 8 & 9. See also SCEPP, supra note 2, at 3-6.
22. The Alquist-Priolo Special Studies Zone Act of 1972, CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 2622(West 1972 & Supp. 1984), requires the State Geologist to establish Special Studies Zones to
encompass all "potentially and recently active" traces of the San Andreas, Calaveras, Hay-
ward, and San Jacinto faults. Faults were defined as active if they showed evidence of surface
displacement during Holocene time (about the last 11,000 years). Faults were defined as po-
tentially active if there is evidence of surface displacement during Quaternary time (last 2 to 3
[Vol. 24
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the average homeowner cannot be expected to make an informed and
well-reasoned decision whether or not to purchase such coverage. As
a result, those who are the poorest risks are the most likely to apply
for coverage, thereby limiting the extent to which the risk of loss can
be distributed. This result is known as "adverse selection."2
Complicating this approach is the fact that the mere existence of
an exclusionary clause does not necessarily preclude recovery.
Whether or not a policyholder recovers may depend on whether the
exclusionary clause is interpreted narrowly or broadly by the court.
A narrow interpretation of a boilerplate exclusionary clause that is
reproduced in thousands of policies could expose an insurer to unex-
pected losses in significant quantities, which would result in insol-
vency if adequate financial resources are not available.2 On the
other hand, if the clause is construed broadly to limit coverage, the
insured could possibly be left with a major loss and no adequate
source of recovery. The issue thus becomes one of interpretation.
III. INSURANCE POLICY INTERPRETATION
Insurance policy interpretation involves two potentially conflict-
ing theories of contract analysis. The traditional theory2" holds that
an insurance policy is a standard contract, and therefore when its
terms are plain and unambiguous it is the duty of the court to hold
the parties to the contract." The alternate theory is based on the
concept that insurance contracts are distinguishable from standard
contracts, and thus application of classical theories of interpretation
will lead to unconscionable results. 27
Proponents of the latter theory rely on concepts such as contra
proferentem, 2 reasonable expectation,2 9 unconscionability,80  and
million years). The first CEZ/PMLE Program Report was prepared in 1981, and in the
Forward to the 1982 edition, it is noted that "these reports provide the only specific earth-
quake loss estimate information by earthquake zones along with the total aggregate zone liabil-
ity. There is no other source of such information." Id. at iii (emphasis is original).
23. See SCEPP, supra note 2, at 26. Studies have shown that earthquake insurance
policy sales increase after a single earthquake, then drop when the perceived danger has
passed. Id. at 4-5.
24. See supra note 9.
25. Holmes, Interpreting an Insurance Policy in Georgia: The Problem of the Eviden-
tiary Condition, 12 GA. L. REV. 783, 784 (1978).
26. See, e.g., Wolf Machinery v. Ins. Co. of North America, 133 Cal. App. 3d 324, 328,
183 Cal. Rptr. 695, 697 (1982).
27. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 336-47 (2d ed. 1977);
see also Holmes, supra note 25, at 786.
28. Holmes, supra note 25, at 789 n.25 (1978) (defining contra proferentem as a "suc-
cinct expression of the familiar principle that courts will strictly construe insurance policies
19841
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public policy."1 This approach finds support in the modern view that
insurance contracts are considered "contracts of adhesion,""2 and
should be treated differently than other contracts. 3
A. Scope of Liability Depends on Interpretation of the Exclusion-
ary Clause
The determination of an insurer's liability for a claim is a com-
plex issue involving questions of both fact and law. Whether a par-
ticular event was the proximate cause of the insured's loss is gener-
ally a question of fact to be determined by the jury. 4 When the
proximate cause has been determined or the facts are not in dispute,
the issue becomes a matter of interpreting the policy itself. The cor-
rect construction of a contract provision, such as an exclusionary
against the insurer and resolve all ambiguities and doubts in the insured's favor.").
29. See generally R. KEETON, supra note 7, at 350-61 (§ 6.3, Honoring Reasonable
Expectations).
30. See generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 27, at 318-28; Holmes,
supra note 25, at 796. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979), which
states:
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any
unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.
Id.
31. RE.STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 207 (1979), states that "[in choosing
among the reasonable meaning of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, a meaning that
serves the public interest is generally preferred." (formerly § 236(0). U. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, supra note 27, at 122 n.40, suggest that both Corbin and Williston are in accord as
to this and other rules of contract interpretation).
32. See, e.g., Neal v. State Farm Ins. Co., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 694, 10 Cal. Rptr.
781, 784 (1961) (stating that a contract of adhesion is a standardized contract, imposed and
drafted by a party in a superior bargaining position, allowing the subscribing party only the
opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it); see generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO,
supra note 27, at 336-47, (discussing the treatment of contracts of adhesion within the context
of the duty to read).
33. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 27, at 336; see also Gray v. Zurich Ins.
Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 105 (1966) (holding that the doctrine of
adhesion contracts required resolving uncertainties in an exclusionary clause in favor of the
reasonable expectations of the insured); Stevens v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377
P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962) (holding that application of an exclusionary clause in
flight insurance policy dispensed by vending machine would be unconscionable).
34. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Videfreeze Corp., 540 F.2d 1171, 1179-80
(3rd Cir. 1976) (whether testimony of insured's experts provided evidence from which jurors
could find that earthquake had occurred, creating jury question as to cause of rock slide);
Gullett v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1971) (evidence raised
jury question as to whether damage to building was caused by falling objects or collapse of
building, or by landslide or other earth movement, in determining whether loss was covered).
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clause, is a question of law subject to de novo review.3 5
Consequently, the interpretation of the exclusionary clauses in
an insurance contract entails consideration of a number of factors
including: the form of the contract itself," the express language in
the clauses, the factual circumstances giving rise to the claim, and the
compatibility of the result with notions of fairness and public
policy.87
An insurer may effectively limit coverage to the extent allowed
by law and public policy." Some courts have held that when such
limits are set forth in plain, clear and unmistakable language, the
limits should be respected. 9 However, the history of insurance pol-
icy interpretation indicates that statutory provisions and standardized
policies were necessary to provide policyholders with some measure
of protection against unscrupulous insurers.40
35. Leslie Salt Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 637 F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir. 1980); see
also State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, 100, 514 P.2d 123,
127, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811, 815 (1973); Premier Ins. Co. v. Welch, 140 Cal. App. 3d 720, 724,
189 Cal. Rptr. 657, 659 (1983).
36. CAL. INS. CODE § 2070 (West 1972 & Supp. 1984) provides, in pertinent part, that
All fire policies . . . shall be on the standard form, and, except as provided by
this article shall not contain additions hereto. No part of the standard form shall
be omitted therefrom except that any policy providing coverage against the peril
of fire . . . need not comply with the provisions of the standard form. . . pro-
vided that coverage . . . when viewed in its entirety, is substantially equivalent
to or more favorable to the insured than that contained in such standard form
fire insurance policy.
Id. Therefore, an insurance company may provide a modified version of the standard fire
insurance form, but only if it is "substantially equivalent to or moie favorable to the insured"
than the standard policy. Id.
37. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 27, at 336-37 (noting that there is a
growing body of case law supporting the theory that even if there was assent, a term could be
excised from a contract because it contravenes public policy or is unconscionable).
3 . S & H Ins. Co. v. California State Automobile Ass'n Inter-Insurance Bureau
(CSAA-IIB), 139 Cal. App. 3d 509, 515, 188 Cal. Rptr. 722, 725 (1983).
39. See, e.g., Matsuo Yoshida v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 240 F.2d 824, 826-27 (9th Cir.
1957); Wilson v. Insurance Co. of North America, 453 F. Supp. 732, 734 (N.D. Cal. 1978);
National Ins. Underwriters v. Carter, 17 Cal. 3d 380, 384-86, 551 P.2d 362, 365-67, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 42, 45-47, (1976); Safeco Title Ins. Co. v. Moskopoulos, 116 Cal. App. 3d 658, 666, 172
Cal. Rptr. 248, 253 (1981).
40. S. Weinstock & J. Maloney, History and Development of Insurance Law in Cali-
fornia, CAL. INS. CODE, Vol. 1, XXXVII-XCV, (West 1972). The complications surrounding
the settlement of claims following the San Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906 were directly
responsible for the enactment of a standard form fire policy in 1909. Id. at LXIII, (noting that
irresponsibility on the part of unscrupulous insurers in the early days of the insurance business
had led to earlier enactments of standard fire policy laws in Massachusetts in 1873 and in
New York in 1886) Id. at LXXII-LXIV.
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B. Exclusionary Clause Language Must Be Conspicuous, Plain
and Clear
The requirement that language used to limit coverage be "con-
spicuous, plain and clear"' 1 evolved from early statutory contract
provisions, many of which are still in effect. In a recent opinion,
Reserve Ins Co. v. Pisciotta,'2 the California Supreme Court cited
an 1872 provision, Civil Code section 1638, which states that "[t]he
language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language
is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity."' 3 Moreover,
clauses imposing specified duties and obligations on the insured, and
limiting the liability of the insurer, must conform to the "plainly
printed" requirements set forth in section 2073."'
In addition to requiring that exclusionary clauses must be con-
spicuous, plain and clear,'45 courts have also held that exclusionary
clauses are subject to a different rule of construction than that ap-
plied to coverage clauses. Whereas coverage clauses are to be inter-
preted broadly so as to afford the greatest possible protection to the
insured, exclusionary clauses are to be interpreted narrowly against
the insurer. 6 Although this principle is simply stated, it's applica-
tion is complicated by the doctrine of reasonable expectation.
C. Resolving Ambiguities: The Reasonable Expectation Doctrine
and the Burden of Proof
To determine whether the terms of an exclusionary clause are
plain and clear or ambiguous, the courts generally interpret the pol-
icy in light of the plain meaning that a layman would attach to the
words used.' Referring to Civil Code section 1638, the Pisciotta
41. See e.g., Hurd v. Republic Ins. Co., 113 Cal. App. 3d 250, 254, 169 Cal. Rptr. 675,
678 (1980) (holding that notice of limited coverage for household and personal property was
not conspicuous, plain and clear, and that insureds could have reasonably expected that con-
tents of building were insured to limits of policy).
42. 30 Cal. 3d 800, 807, 640 P.2d 764, 767-68, 180 Cal. Rptr. 631-32 (1982).
43. 30 Cal. 3d at 807, 640 P.2d at 767-68, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 631-32.
44. CAL. INS. CODE § 2080 (West 1972 & Supp. 1984).
45. See, e.g., Crane v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 5 Cal. 3d 112, 115-16, 485 P.2d
1129, 1130, 95 Cal. Rptr. 513, 514 (1971); Hurd v. Republic Ins. Co., 113 Cal. App. 3d 250,
253, 169 Cal. Rptr. 675, 677 (1980).
46. See, e.g., State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, 101-
02, 514 P.2d 123, 128, 109 Cal Rptr. 811, 816 (1973); Harris v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 6 Cal.
3d 699, 701, 493 P.2d 861, 862-3, 100 Cal. Rptr. 133, 134-35 (1972); Crane v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 5 Cal. 3d 112, 485 P.2d 1129, 95 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1971).
47. Pisciotta, 30 Cal. 3d at 807, 640 P.2d at 767, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 631. Courts have
emphasized that it is the layman's interpretation that is the standard, not the attorney's or
insurance expert's analysis. See, e.g., Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 30-31, 377 P.2d 889,
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court declared that courts "will not adopt a strained or absurd inter-
pretation in order to create an ambiguity where none exists." '48
However, ambiguities or uncertainties, if found, are resolved against
the insurer so as to "fairly achieve [the] object of providing indem-
nity for the loss to which the insurance relates."49 According to the
Pisciotta court, the purpose of this canon of construction is to protect
the insured's reasonable expectation of coverage in situations involv-
ing a contract of adhesion.5"
The principle of "reasonable expectation" provides an objective
standard to determine the effect of the exclusionary clause.51 While
basing the standard on the reasonable expectation of the layman may
possibly provide the sophisticated policyholder with an advantage in
a policy interpretation dispute, such as an objective standard argua-
bly produces greater certainty and predictability concerning legal
rights. Consequently, the reasonable expectation doctrine, despite its
apparent flaws, may possibly be a better theory than simply resolv-
ing ambiguities against the insurer. 2 One court recently held that
the doctrine of reasonable expectation is only applicable when there
is an ambiguity in the policy, 53 and another court refused to allow
recovery where the policy contained clear and explicit terms, but the
insured did not disclose what he believed the policy meant.54 The
courts have consistently applied the layman's standard of reasonable
expectation, even in cases where it would appear that a higher stan-
dard might be appropriate, such as where the policyholder was a
894-95, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689, 694-95 (1963); City of Mill Valley v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 98
Cal. App. 3d 595, 602, 159 Cal. Rptr. 635, 639 (1979); Crane v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
5 Cal. 3d 112, 115, 485 P.2d 1129, 1130, 95 Cal. Rptr. 513, 514 (1971). Furthermore, recov-
ery is sometimes granted even if the insured is aware of the restrictive terms of the policy, if
enforcement of the policy provision would defeat the reasonable expectations of a great major-
ity of policy holders to whose claims it is relevant. R. KEETON, supra note 7, at 358.
48. Pisciotta, 30 Cal. 3d at 807, 640 P.2d at 767-68, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 631-32. How-
ever, Professor Keeton notes that "[tlhe conclusion is inescapable that courts have sometimes
invented ambiguity where none existed . . . resolving the invented ambiguity contrary to the
plainly expressed terms of the contract document." R. KEETON, supra note 7, at 356.
49. Pisciotta, 30 Cal. 3d at 807-08, 640 P.2d at 768, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 632 (citing
Harris v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 6 Cal. 3d 699, 701, 493 P.2d 861, 862, 100 Cal Rptr. 133, 134
(1972)).
50. Pisciotta, 30 Cal. 3d at 808, 640 P.2d at 768, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 632.
51. R. KEETON, supra note 7, at 351.
52. Id. at 351-56.
53. Wolf Machinery v. Ins. Co. of North America, 133 Cal. App. 3d 324, 328, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 695, 697 (1982).
54. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Ball, 127 Cal. App. 3d 568, 572-73, 179
Cal. Rptr. 644, 647 (1981).
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professor of contract law, or a municipality."0
D. Development of the Concurrent Proximate Cause Doctrine
Even if the exclusionary clause is written in terms that are con-
spicuous, plain and clear, and the court finds that a reasonable lay-
man would not have interpreted the exclusionary terms otherwise,
the insurance company must still meet a heavy burden of proof in
order to show that the insured's loss was not proximately caused by
an insured peril."' The problem arises when the loss results from a
combination of different events, comprising both insured and ex-
cluded perils. The insurer must still show that none of the several
possible causes of the loss are covered under the 'all-risk' policy. The
matter is complicated in order to determine whether any of the sev-
eral possible causes is the "proximate," "immediate," "efficient," or
only a "remote" cause of loss.""
In 1963, the California Supreme Court, in Sabella v. Wisler"8
held that if an insured peril was at least partially the cause of the
resulting loss, the insured would be entitled to recover."9 In Sabella,
the court ruled in favor of an insured whose house had been dam-
aged when a ruptured sewer line allowed waste water to be emptied
onto loose fill under the house, resulting in subsidence of the earth.6"
Although the court found that the exclusionary clause, excepting cov-
erage for "loss ... by ... settling" appeared sufficiently understand-
able to an ordinary reader, the court relied instead on the theory that
when there is a concurrence of causes, the efficient cause is the one to
which the loss is to be attributed.61
55. In Garvey, supra note 8, the plaintiff-homeowner was a professor of law at the
Univ. of San Francisco, a point noted by the appellant in his opening brief (AOB 3). In
General Ins. Co. of America v. City of Belvedere, 582 F. Supp. 88 (1984), a federal district
court applied the reasonable expectation standard in holding that an exclusionary clause did
not operate to limit coverage for losses arising out of a judgment for inverse condemnation
against a municipality.
56. R. KEETON, supra note 7, at 272-73; See also Strubble v. United Services Automo-
bile Ass'n., 35 Cal. App. 3d 498, 110 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1973).
57. CAL. INS. CODE § 530 (West 1972), states:
An insurer is liable for a loss of which a peril insured against was the proxi-
mate cause, although a peril not contemplated by the contract may have been a
remote cause of the loss; but he is not liable for a loss of which the peril insured
against was only a remote cause.
58. 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963) (action for damages to home
as result of subsidence of earth despite fact that policy excluded coverage for physical damage
due to "settling" upheld).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 31-32. The court found that the breaking of the sewer pipe and subsequent
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In 1973, in State Farm v. Partridge,"' the California Supreme
Court upheld the trial court's finding that when two separate, dis-
tinct and different acts both proximately and concurrently contribute
to the plaintiff's injuries, the plaintiff can recover under both an au-
tomobile policy and a homeowner's policy. 8 In Partidge, the injury
resulted when the policyholder drove his four-wheel drive vehicle off
the road in pursuit of a rabbit and a pistol that he had modified
discharged as the vehicle hit a bump. The court allowed recovery
under the homeowner policy despite a clause excluding coverage for
"bodily injury . . . arising out of the . . . use of . . . any motor
vehicle .... "64 The court declined to predicate the insurer's liabil-
ity upon the ambiguity of the exclusionary clause. Instead, it ex-
pressly declared that when an insured risk and an excluded risk con-
stitute concurrent proximate causes of the accident, the insurer is
liable so long as one of the causes is covered by the policy.65
E. Application of the Concurrent Cause Doctrine to Exclusionary
Clauses in Natural Disasters
Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Guyton"6 involved flood
flow of waste water was an "unanticipated external event" which greatly accelerated the "in-
herent vices," and was thus the "efficient proximate cause" of the loss. Sabella, 59 Cal. 2d at
34, 377 P.2d at 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
62. 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1973).
63. Id. at 100-07, 514 P.2d at 127-132, 109 Cal.Rptr. at 815-820.
64. Id. at 99, 514 P.2d at 126, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
65. Id. at 102, 514 P.2d at 129, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
Although there may be some question whether either of the two causes in the
instant case can be properly characterized as the "prime," "moving" or "effi-
cient" cause of the accident, we believe that coverage under a liability insurance
policy is equally available to an insured whenever an insured risk constitutes
simply a concurrent proximate cause of the injuries.
Id.
California is not the only jurisdiction which adheres to the concurrent cause doctrine. In
their appellate brief, the respondents in Garvey, supra note 8, cite numerous cases from vari-
ous jurisdictions that have applied the doctrine and allowed the insureds to recover. General
American Transportation Corp. v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., 369 F.2d 906, 908 (6th Cir.
1966); Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. of San Francisco v. Hanley, 252 F.2d 780, 785 (6th
Cir. 1958) cert. denied, 78 S.Ct. 791; Pearl Assur. Co. v. Stacey Bros. Gas Constr. Co., 114
F.2d 702, 706 (6th Cir. 1940); Essex House v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 404
F.Supp. 978, 991-92 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Milan v. Providence Washington Insurance Co., 227
F. Supp. 251, 253 (E.D. La. 1964); Mattis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 454 N.E.2d
1156, 1164 (Ill. App. 5th Dist., 1983); Lawyer v. Boling, 238 N.W.2d 514, 521 (Wis. 1976);
Avis v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 195 S.E.2d 545, 549 (N.C. 1973); Vormelker v. Oleksin-
ski, 199 N.W.2d 287, 294 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972).
66. Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1982). The policy-
holder's "all-risk" homeowner's policy covered losses caused by third-party negligence, but
excluded losses "CAUSED BY, RESULTING FROM, CONTRIBUTED TO OR AGGRAVATED BY . . .
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damage that resulted when heavy rains accompanying Hurricane
Kathleen broke through flood control facilities and inundated parts
of the City of Palm Desert, California. The policyholders contended
that their losses were proximately caused by the water district's neg-
ligence in maintaining the flood control facilities, and therefore their
losses were covered as damages resulting from third-party negli-
gence.67 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the concur-
rent cause doctrine set forth in Partridge, 68 although not addressed
by the Safeco district court, was dispositive in the policyholder's
favor.69
This doctrine was similarly applied in Premier Insurance Co.
v. Welch,7 ° which involved a house that had slid off its foundation
and overturned into a ravine. The parties had stipulated that the
slide would not have occurred if a drain, designed to release subsur-
face waters, had not been damaged. The damage to the subdrain was
not the result of natural causes, but most likely was caused by the
original sewer contractor.7 1 Citing Sabella 2 and Partridge,71 the
Welch court stated that the insurer's liability under the policy de-
pended on whether the efficient cause of the loss (the cause that set
others in motion) was a covered peril. 74 The court held that the
heavy rains, although a significant contributing factor, "failed to
comprise a superseding cause breaking the chain of causation and
being able to produce the loss independently of the damaged
FLOOD, SURFACE WATER . . . OVERFLOW OF STREAMS OR OTHER BODIES OF WATER . . . ALL
WHETHER DRIVEN BY WIND OR NOT . . . . Id. at 552-53 (emphasis in original).
67. The district court had refused to allow expert testimony to substantiate the policy-holder's contention that similar policies had been interpreted to cover such losses, and held
instead that the language in the policy was clear. Id. at 553. Since the court of appeals found
that the losses were covered if third-party negligence was established, it did not reach the
question whether the refusal to allow expert testimony was in error. Id. at 557.
68. 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1973).
69. Safeco, 692 F.2d 551, 554-55.
70. Premier Ins. Co. v. Welch, 140 Cal. App. 3d 720, 189 Cal. Rptr 657 (1983).
71. The homeowner's policy provided coverage for "all risks of physical loss" exceptlosses "CAUSED BY, RESULTING FROM, CONTRIBUTED TO OR AGGRAVATED BY . . . (C)
WATER BELOW THE SURFACE OR THE GROUND INCLUDING THAT WHICH EXERTS PRESSURE
ON OR FLOWS, SEEPS OR LEAKS THROUGH . . . FOUNDATIONS 
. . . ." 140 Cal. App. 3d at
724, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 658-59 (emphasis in original).
72. 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963) (physical damage to house
due to settling caused by broken pipe).
73. 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1973) (modified gun trigger
concurrent cause of injury).
74. 140 Cal. App. 3d at 725, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 660. The court noted that here the
causal sequence began with the negligent installation of the sewer line in 1972, and that the





Legislative attempts to resolve risk distribution and loss alloca-
tion problems are subject to all of the inherent difficulties of the leg-
islative process, most notably those involving issues of public policy,
fairness, and interpretation, not to mention political lobbying efforts
of special interest groups. Specifically, legislative attempts to pre-
cisely delineate coverage limits are complicated by the difficulties in-
volved in calculating probabilities of natural events such as earth-
quakes. Earthquakes are unpredictable as to their intensity, their
location, and their frequency. Nevertheless, the severity of their de-
structive force and their pervasive impact on society generally makes
it essential to address the issue of how best to distribute the risk.
In addition to various legislative proposals and enactments, nu-
merous other strategies and programs have been proposed. To the
extent that each proposal attempts to address a particular aspect of
the problem, it deserves full consideration. However, just as there is
no one perfect solution to the entire problem, most of the proposals
are deficient in one or more aspects. A comprehensive review of all
of these proposals is beyond the scope of this comment, but a brief
discussion of a few will serve to provide the reader with an apprecia-
tion for some of the factors involved in determining an appropriate
solution.
This section will briefly review some of the strategies discussed
in the comprehensive Southern California Earthquake Preparedness
Report (SCEPP).7 In addition, this section will highlight certain
aspects of the new provisions of the California Insurance Code
which attempt to address some of the problems discussed previously,
and will point out areas of potential conflict with existing conditions.
A. SCEPP Strategies and Proposals
The SCEPP report77 discusses three strategies based on the pre-
mise that the federal government should serve as the focal point of a
solution to the earthquake insurance issue.78 The first strategy in-
75. Id.
76. See supra note 2.
77. Id.
78. SCEPP, supra note 2, at 29. The SCEPP report cites the fact that earthquakes are
not just a west coast problem but affect some 39 states. A major earthquake would cause
"economic dislocation of national proportions," and the ability of the industry to build up
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volves redirecting federal disaster relief programs toward more effec-
tive preparedness and hazard mitigation. 79 The second strategy pro-
poses establishing a program similar to the National Flood
Insurance Program.8" The third strategy proposes a combined pro-
gram, involving expanding insurance coverage with government rein-
surance programs, and modifications of the present tax restrictions. 8'
The report points out that while there is considerable support
for the federal government to increase its traditional role of providing
disaster relief in the form of emergency service and loans, there is
little enthusiasm for direct federal intervention in the earthquake in-
surance market.8" According to SCEPP, the government's functions
should be to "stimulate and support improved use and enforcement
of earthquake loss-mitigation measures."88 This would involve the
development of programs designed to encourage greater efforts at the
state and local levels to improve disaster preparedness and to develop
and to enforce tougher building safety standards.8 '
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) has been rec-
ommended as a model for the development of a similar program for
earthquakes.85 The NFIP was established because the federal re-
sponse to flood disasters was unsatisfactory, and because it neither
reduced losses nor discouraged flood plain management.86 Under the
NFIP, proper land use and flood plain mismanagement are accom-
plished through incentives and enforced under the threat of with-
drawal of the subsidies if standards are not met.87
catastrophe reserves is restricted by federal tax regulations. The report claims that the scope of
the problem, the size of the potential economic loss, and the source of the solution all indicate
that the federal government be involved. Id. at 30.
79. SCEPP, supra note 2, at 31-34. See also infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
80. SCEPP, supra note 2, at 34-40. See also infra note 84 and accompanying text.
81. SCEPP, supra note 2, at 40-41.
82. Id. at 31.
83. Id. at 32.
84. The idea of improving local efforts at disaster preparedness and hazard mitigation is
a subject of growing interest. See, e.g., Scott, California Cities and Seismic Safety, WESTERN
CITY, August 1983, at 6-16, and Siegel, Reducing the Risk, WESTERN CITY, August 1983, at
12-13. Both articles provide suggestions and general discussion on actions that municipalities
can take to reduce the effects of a devastating earthquake.
85. SCEPP, supra note 2, at 34-39; The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP),
administered by FEMA, was established by the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub.
L. No. 90448, 82 Stat. 572 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2414, 4001-4128 (1976 & Supp III
1979)). See also Baram & Miyares, Managing Flood Risk, 7 COLUM. J. ENVTL. 129-64
(1982).
86. SCEPP, supra note 2, at 35. Typical federal responses to flood disasters included
the construction of flood control works such as claims, levees and seawalls.
87. Id. at 36. One such incentive offered was federally subsidized flood insurance in
communities with approved programs.
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The SCEPP report suggests that such a program would en-
counter strong opposition from the insurance industry, due partially
to the resentment against federal incursion into the "free market"
system, and partially to fears that the federal government would
eventually take over such a national program entirely because of its
sheer complexity. 8 Furthermore, there is probably little support in
the Congress or in the Executive branch for expanding the govern-
ment's role into an area presently controlled by private industry.8
The third strategy proposed by the SCEPP report, involves a
combination of programs. First, the federal government would con-
tinue to provide emergency assistance and relief loans.90 Second, the
government would act as a reinsurer in order to allow insurance
companies to expand their coverage and to increase the allocation of
the loss." Theoretically, if insurance companies could be assured of
government support in allocating the loss, they could afford to offer
broader coverage, and thus could distribute the risk more widely.'
Third, the federal government would modify its tax policies, which
presently tend to restrict the buildup of catastrophe reserves.' Fed-
eral reinsurance and modification of IRS policies would allow the
insurance companies to increase contingency reserves, without the re-
strictions concurrently imposed by increased tax liabilities.'
While this third strategy contains elements essential to a suc-
cessful program, namely government supported reinsurance and revi-
sions of certain tax provisions, it is inadequate in at least two impor-
tant aspects. First it does not provide the insurance industry with
incentives to develop policies which are designed to promote appro-
priate damage mitigation measures. Allowing the insurance compa-
nies to retain larger reserves without tax penalties will help prevent
industry insolvency, but will do nothing to reduce the potential de-
mand on these reserves. Second, this strategy does not address the
possible role of government, either alone or in cooperation with the
private industry, in conducting research and development of appro-
priate construction techniques.
88. Id. at 39. It is conceivable that such a program would eventually include coverage
for losses due to other natural disasters, such as tornadoes, hurricanes, etc.
89. Id. at 39-40.
90. Id. at 40.
91. Id. at 41. CAL. INS. CODE § 3080 (West 1972), requires insurance companies to
reinsure if liabilities for a single event (e.g., earthquake) exceed 10% of their net assets.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. SCEPP, supra note 2, at 26-27. Tax restrictions were cited in the SCEPP report as
being a major concern among insurers.
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B. Legislative Approaches
The approach set forth in the recently enacted legislation at-
tempts to address two primary concerns. First, the statute addresses
the problem of insurance availability and the related problem of low
participation. Second, the statute expressly addresses the concurrent
cause issue. For the reasons discussed below, however, the legislation
misses the mark as to the first concern, and fails to adequately ad-
dress the second.
The statute contains two statements of legislative intent, the
first of which is to "promote awareness of earthquake insurance...
by requiring insurers to offer that coverage.""' This objective ap-
pears to address the problems of a "soft" market where, despite the
availability of affordable rates, only five percent of California home-
owners carry earthquake insurance." The SCEPP report summa-
rizes this problem as follows: "insurance providers are reluctant to
aggressively market earthquake insurance, and potential insurers are
unaware of, [and/or] misinformed about, earthquake insurance.' 97
Due to the problem of adverse selection'" and the short, thirty-
day acceptance period, it seems unlikely that a significant number of
residential property owners, who have not purchased earthquake
coverage, will now take advantage of the mandated offer. The statute
expressly provides that if the offer is not accepted within the thirty-
day limit, there shall be a conclusive presumption that the named
insured has elected not to accept the coverage." Further, if the offer
is not accepted the insurer shall not be required to offer earthquake
coverage again to the named insured.100 Moreover, the election not to
accept is binding upon any other person insured or any other party
having an insurable interest in the insured property.1 ' The decision
whether or not to make the coverage available at another time is
wholly within the insurer's discretion.
A named insured who does not accept the offer within the
thirty-day time limit, for any reason, might find that he or she is
foreclosed from recovery under the existing policy, and is possibly
prohibited from purchasing additional coverage under the statute's
conclusive presumption provision. The homeowner who is denied re-
95. CAL. INS. CODE (Stats. 1984, Ch. 916, p. 46, Sec. 2).
96. SCEPP, supra note 2, at 16.
97. Id.
98. See supra note 23.
99. CAL. INS. CODE § 10085 (West Supp. 1985).
100. CAL. INS. CODE § 10086 (West Supp. 1985).
101. CAL. INS. CODE § 10085 (West Supp. 1985).
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covery might argue that he had not received the offer in sufficient
time to conduct a reasonable evaluation of the company's offer with
regard to his assessment of the risks involved. Realistically, thirty
days is an unreasonably short period of time to make an intelligent
decision given the complexity of various insurance policies. A "con-
clusive presumption" of nonelection of coverage imposes an undue
hardship on the homeowner.
The court may, on the other hand, conclude that the hardship
imposed by the restrictive provisions, when construed in light of the
statutory intent to "promote awareness," would be more equitably
interpreted as imposing a rebuttable presumption of noncoverage.
The legislation expressly provides that:
It is the intent of the Legislature to make clear that loss caused
by or resulting from an earthquake shall be compensable by in-
surance coverage only when earthquake protection is provided
through a policy provision or endorsement designed specifically
to indemnify against the risk of earthquake loss, and not
through policies where the peril of earthquake is specifically ex-
cluded even though another cause of loss acts together with an
earthquake to produce the loss.
10 1
This passage should be read in conjunction with the provision
stating that a policy which does not cover the peril of earthquake
shall not be held to provide coverage for "any loss or damage when
earthquake is a proximate cause regardless of whether the loss...
results from, or is contributed to, . . . by any other proximate or
remote cause, whether or not covered by the policy."' ' Simply
stated, these provisions declare that if the policyholder does not ac-
cept the offer and purchase earthquake coverage, the concurrent cau-
sation doctrine shall not be applied even if an insured peril is a con-
tributing, proximate cause of the damage.
Although the intent is clear, the results are not. The issue in
each case would be whether or not the damage was proximately
caused by an earthquake. Resolution of this question will very likely
require expert testimony to establish or disprove earthquake as a
proximate cause. One study showed that in 1975, seismograph sta-
tions recorded 2858 earthquakes in the greater San Francisco Bay
area that year, or more than seven per day.104 If a homeowner with-
out earthquake coverage happens to discover indications of structural
102. CAL. INS. CODE § 10081 (West Supp. 1985).
103. CAL.. INS. CODE § 10088 (West Supp. 1985).
104. K. STEINBRUGGE, supra note 9, at 19.
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damage one day while working in the yard, and it turns out that the
damage is due to negligence on the part of the contractor, the ques-
tion will be whether the insurance company would be able to deny
recovery on the grounds that it is more likely than not that the dam-
age was proximately caused by one or more low magnitude tremors.
The language of the statute indicates that if a covered peril and
an earthquake are both proximate causes of the damage, and the
policy does not contain earthquake coverage, no recovery will be
granted for the loss. One resulting problem will be tracing and limit-
ing the chain of causation. For example, if a slight earthquake
causes a lit candle to tip over, and sets a fire that destroys the house,
and the policy did not cover earthquakes, the language of the statute
indicates that the fire coverage under the all-risk policy would not be
effective. What if a neighbor, also without earthquake coverage, suf-
fered extensive smoke and water damage? Again, the language indi-
cates that no recovery would be granted.
Another situation in which the effect of the statute is unclear, is
when the homeowner has purchased earthquake coverage, but his or
her policy contains an exclusion for damage caused by, contributed
to, or aggravated by water seepage.1"5 If an earthquake causes an
underground water main or sewer line to break, and the resulting
water seepage causes damage, would the exclusionary clause operate
to limit the coverage provided under the earthquake coverage? If so,
it would seem pointless to purchase earthquake coverage. On the
other hand, if the court permitted coverage on the ground that the
intent of the statute was to preclude application of the concurrent
cause doctrine only when earthquake coverage was not purchased, it
would frustrate the purpose of the exclusionary clause.
In any event, the questions will remain unanswered until the
courts have an opportunity to review the new provisions of the stat-
ute. Meanwhile, both homeowners and insurance companies will
continue to suffer from the effects of the ensuing uncertainty. It is
doubtful that insurance companies can reasonably rely on the new
code provisions in light of past judicial interpretations of insurance
policies, yet they must still determine appropriate premium rates.
Consequently, homeowners will undoubtedly be confronted with a
wide array of policy options with varying rates and terms.
Meanwhile, the underlying problems of uncertainty and insol-
vency remain unabated by the new statute. Accordingly, if these
problems are to be resolved, the legislature should go one step fur-
105. See supra note 71.
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ther if the needs of homeowners and insurance companies are to be
adequately protected. An alternative approach, involving a compul-
sory earthquake insurance program, would offer several opportuni-
ties for providing such protection.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: COMPULSORY EARTHQUAKE
INSURANCE
This portion of the comment will discuss an alternative ap-
proach to the problem of earthquake risk distribution that is based
on the no-fault basic protection plan proposed for the automobile
insurance industry.'0 Specifically, it will focus on a proposal that
utilizes the potential risk distribution capabilities of the insurance
industry, avoids the complexities inherent in determining causation,
and provides for a more equitable distribution of the risk.
Instead of making it mandatory for the insurance industry to
offer earthquake coverage, this proposal suggests that the better ap-
proach is to make it mandatory for property owners to purchase
earthquake insurance. By making the purchase of earthquake cover-
age compulsory, problems created by adverse selection, complex cau-
sation issues, and related difficulties are reduced or eliminated. Mak-
ing earthquake coverage an integral part of every property owner's
insurance program may promote greater public interest in disaster
preparedness and recovery programs, and encourage greater partici-
pation by engineers, geologists, marketing specialists and local gov-
ernments in the search for a solution.
A. Automobile Claim Compensation-A Social Problem
An appropriate and useful model for the compulsory earth-
quake insurance proposal is the no-fault, basic protection plan devel-
oped by Professors Robert E. Keeton1 0 7 and Jeffrey O'Connell' 8 in
the 1960s. Their studies of problems associated with compensating
victims of automobile accidents 0 9 revealed that some injured persons
received no compensation at all while others received far less than
their economic loss.1 1 They attributed this gap in part to the role
fault played in the system-in order to recover, the injured had to
106. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
107. Professor of Law, Harvard University.
108. Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
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assert both that another was at fault and that he himself was blame-
less."' Further, the system was slow, cumbersome, and costly to ad-
minister, and consumed vast quantities of time and resources without
providing the indemnity it was designed to provide." 2 In addition to
the toll of physical injury, the study found that the temptations to
exaggerate claims or otherwise seek maximum recovery further in-
creased the costs in terms of psychological and moral injury."' In
short, Professors Keeton and O'Connell felt that the (then) present
automobile claims system "provides too little, too late, unfairly allo-
cated, at wasteful cost, and through means that promote dishonesty
and disrespect for the law. '1 1'
The problem as Professors Keeton and O'Connell saw it, be-
came a social problem. Unlike the victim in an isolated accident, " 5
the automobile accident victim became a social problem, "both be-
cause of his number and because of the source of his injury." ' 6 Ac-
cording to Professors Keeton and O'Connell, the organized groups
most concerned with the problem, insurance companies and trial
lawyers, had special interests somewhat at odds with policyholders
and the public in general.1 17
Due to the maladjusted allocation of compensation, and the ris-
ing costs caused by inefficient administration of the system, the over-
all costs were disproportionate to the benefits gained."' Conse-
quently, the portion of premiums collected that was used to
compensate victims was inadequately low. 1 9
The plan proposed by Professors Keeton and O'Connell called
I 11. Id. at 1. (Of course, this was modified in those states that have adopted contribu-
tory negligence).
112. Id. at 1-2.
113. Id. at 3.
114. Id.
115. Professors Keeton and O'Connell used the example of a person slipping and injur-
ing himself in a bath tub at home. Id. at 3-4.
116. Id. at 4, quoted in Marx, Compensation Insurance for Automobile Accident Vic-
tims: The Case for Compulsory Automobile Compensation Insurance, 15 OHIO ST. L.J. 134,
148 (1954).
117. Id. See also Holmes, Interpreting an Insurance Policy in Georgia: The Problem of
the Evidentiary Condition, 12 GA. L. REV. 783, 788 (1978) (citing the need to protect the
reasonable expectations of the "four competing interests-the insured, insurance company,
other policyholders, and the general public" as justification for control over policy terms).
118. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 109, at 69-70.
119. Id. at 71. Professors Keeton and O'Connell note that "less than half of the automo-
bile tort liability insurance premium dollar ever reaches the pocket of any victim as compensa-
tion for his injury." Id. at n.190. By contrast, recall that during a 20-year period in California




for compulsory automobile insurance under which the victim could
claim "basic protection benefits" up to certain specified limits.12
The Keeton-O'Connell approach was essentially a basic protection
plan that shifted from a conventional third-party setting to first-
party setting.""1 By providing immediate compensation for economic
loss and medical costs in the event of an earthquake, a similar plan
would significantly reduce the degree of uncertainty involved in the
recovery process following a natural disaster.
B. Application of the Compulsory, No-Fault Plan to Earthquake
Insurance: Some Unique Advantages
Application of the compulsory, no-fault plan to earthquake in-
surance offers several advantages. The compulsory approach appears
uniquely suited to some of the more salient problems involved with
earthquake insurance, such as adverse selection and issues of proxi-
mate cause. The problems associated with inefficient allocation of
compensation, cost of administration, waste and fraud which are ad-
dressed by the no-fault plan are similar to the problems involved in
earthquake insurance.
In addition, many problems involved with automobile insurance
claims would not be significant factors in earthquake insurance set-
tlements, such as determining percentages of comparative negligence,
and compensating victims for pain and suffering caused by reckless-
ness.... Moreover, by largely eliminating the need to determine rela-
tive degrees of proximate cause and to litigate various doctrines of
policy interpretation, application of the plan should reduce the de-
gree of uncertainty that presently exists.
A compulsory earthquake insurance plan that provides coverage
based on the results rather than the cause of the loss would not re-
120. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 109, chs. 6 and 7.
121. The plan extended the medical payments provision to cover out-of-pocket losses
and wage losses up to a maximum of $10,000. One who intentionally suffered injury was
excluded. To deter parties from bringing small cases to court, the first $10,000 of economic
losses and the first $5,000 of pain and suffering were excluded from a tort award. A deductible
was imposed to prevent small claims from burdening the system. Additional coverage was
available at extra cost. A victim could recover full tort damages from someone other than a
motorist, but must reimburse the no-fault insurer for benefits received. See generally M.
FRANKLIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 800-01 (2d ed.
1979). The Keeton-O'Connell plan was not the only no-fault proposal that had been made,
but it was the most comprehensive and significant study done up to that time on the subject.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 566 (4th ed. 1971).
122. See generally Marryott, The Tort System and Automobile Claims: Evaluating the
Keeton-O'Connell Proposal, 52 A.B.A. J. 639, 643 (1966); M. FRANKLIN, supra note 121.
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quire the complex determinations of causation that presently compli-
cate settlement. Hence, this approach would minimize the difficulties
inherent in sorting out both obscure distinctions between conclusive
and inconclusive causation clauses, 2 ' and problems associated with
legal causation questions.' 24 Under this approach, policy liability
would be based on loss due to damage resulting from, not caused by,
an earthquake.
C. The Compulsory Approach is Compatible with Existing Risk
Distribution Methods
Basically, the proposed plan would involve establishing a rate
based on the factors that are currently used to determine earthquake
insurance rates, namely by the geographic location (zone) 2 5 and
type of building construction. M From this calculation, a multiplying
factor could be developed to determine the probability that certain
types of damage would result in the event of an earthquake.'27 This
123. See R. KEETON, supra note 7, at 306-17.
124. Id. at 317-19.
125. The state of California is divided into eight earthquake insurance zones (A-H), for
the purposes of PML studies. The zones are based on a probable maximum loss zone, defined
in part by a fault, and in part by county boundaries. All but one zone are made up of more
than one county. The two most intensely populated zones are the Metropolitan San Francisco
and north coast (Zone A) and the Los Angeles-Orange Counties (Zone B). CEZ/PMLE Pro-
gram Report (1981), supra note 9, at 6-10. In addition, the Alquist-Priolo Special Studies
Zones Act was enacted in 1972, and is codified in the Public Resources Code at §§ 2621-2630.
The purpose of the Act is to prohibit the location of most structures for human occupancy
across the traces of active faults and to mitigate thereby the hazard of fault-rupture. CAL. PUB.
REs. CODE § 2621.5 (West Supp. 1984). One section, in particular, states:
A person who is acting as an agent for a seller of real property which is located
within a delineated special studies zone, or the seller if he is acting without any
agent, shall disclose to any prospective purchaser the fact that the property is
located within a delineated special studies zone.
CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 2621.9 (West Supp. 1984).
126. Buildings are classified by type of construction and size into approximately six
major classifications, and up to 19 subclassifications, depending on the particular breakdown
being used. See, e.g., K. STEINBRUGGE, supra note 9, at ch. 5; CEZ/PMLE Program Report
(1982), supra note 9, at A6-A9. Generally, these classifications are used to determine rates and
deductible amounts when computing earthquake insurance premiums. For example, a person
with a small wood-frame house, less than four stories, would pay around $1.50 per $1,000 of
coverage (depending upon which zone the house was situated in), whereas an unreinforced
masonry or adobe building would run around $25 per $1,000 of coverage. P. YANEV, supra
note 11, at 234.
127. This proposal simply requires that the probability of a covered peril, such as fire,
flood, or structural damage, be recomputed, taking into account the aforementioned zones and
building classifications. An essential consideration would include various hazard mitigation ef-
forts, such as local municipal code enforcement efforts, and the structural integrity of public
safety buildings, etc. Premiums could be developed on an individual basis, or by general cate-
gories, with discounts offered for special hazard mitigation efforts. The resulting rate determi-
EARTHQUAKE INSURANCE
multiplying factor would then be utilized in determining premium
rates.
For example, the probability of fire damage in a wood-frame
house which uses natural gas and is located near a major, known
fault trace would be higher than the probability of fire damage of a
similar house located in another zone. As a result, it would be rea-
sonable to charge a slightly higher rate for fire insurance for the first
house. Also, rates for flood and other water damage could be ad-
justed to reflect potential damage, for example, where a house is lo-
cated below a dam or irrigation levee.' 28
By applying the probability of earthquake damage to a particu-
lar structure (a factor of the geographic zone and classification of
building construction) to the schedule of covered risks (e.g., fire, col-
lapse), a more realistic aggregate PML can be determined. While
this would have the initial effect of raising the total amount of pre-
miums required, by distributing the aggregate PML over a wider
population, a more efficient and equitable distribution of risk could
be achieved.
Once the aggregate PML and the premium rates are deter-
mined, a schedule of discounts could be developed to encourage im-
plementation of hazard mitigation efforts, such as improved con-
struction techniques and more stringent building code standards." 9
Information about earthquake-resistant construction techniques and
other mitigation measures is already available, and is presently used
to modify the calculations for aggregate PML.'30
This approach would not only shift the focus of insurance in-
dustry resources and efforts from liability limitation to hazard miti-
gation, but would encourage competitive marketing strategies. 8 ' The
application of this concept could be expanded to municipal and
county entities, to encourage communities to pool their resources and
implement mitigation efforts, and thus help their residents to obtain
more favorable rates. In fact, emergency preparedness measures
taken by the local government entity, such as replacing antiquated
public safety buildings and developing comprehensive disaster aid
nation would be a more accurate reflection of the true probability of possible loss.
128. Such an approach would be compatible with the general program and objectives of
the National Flood Insurance Plan (NFIP). See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., K. STEINBRUGGE, supra note 9, at 204-16.
131. For example, if studies by an insurance company proved that a certain construction
technique or structural reinforcement process was particularly effective in withstanding earth-
quake damage, the company would have the option of offering a discount as an inducement to
attract policyholders.
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plans, should be a critical factor in the calculus to determine appro-
priate rates.1
8 2
In addition to discounts, a schedule of deductibles could be de-
veloped to eliminate "nuisance claims," ''  and to allow policyholders
some degree of flexibility in adjusting their own share of the risk.
Claims adjusters will need to develop techniques to determine
whether reported damage resulted from a particular earthquake
event, from previous earthquakes, or from one or more after-
shocks. 8 " Insurers will have to determine if the deductible applies
only to the initial tremor, or to individual aftershocks after a certain
period of time. These problems presently exist anyway, and must be
addressed eventually.
Application of a compulsory earthquake insurance plan would
ideally result in a more equitable and efficient distribution of the
risk. The total risk would be carried by all instead of a few, thus
keeping the cost of premiums at a reasonable level. The amount of
the premium would depend on factors related to the economic risk
involved, and provide a mechanism for encouraging implementation
of hazard mitigation measures, either on an individual or commu-
nity-wide basis. This approach would allow insurance companies to
utilize competitive marketing strategies to attract policyholders, and
perhaps provide an incentive to the insurance industry to channel
funds now spent in litigation into research and development of
proven damage mitigation measures.
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this comment has been to discuss some of the
complex problems associated with interpreting exclusionary clauses
to all-risk casualty homeowner policies, and to review the new provi-
sions of the California Insurance Code requiring insurance compa-
nies to offer earthquake insurance to residential property owners.
132. As demonstrated by the San Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906, the total
amount of damages can be exacerbated by several factors in a significant earthquake, as de-
structive forces combine to create even greater losses. This synergistic effect can be lessened by
an aggressive, community-wide program of building code enforcement, including public safety
buildings such as fire stations, public shelters, and hospitals. Despite the existence of mutual
aid agreements between cities and counties, a significant earthquake affecting a widespread
area would quickly involve all available emergency resources, further reducing efforts at dam-
age mitigation and rendering mutual aid agreements all but useless. See generally K. STEIN-
BRUGGE, supra note 9, at 217-32 (describing in detail the events of several major
earthquakes).




However, the new statute raises several new questions and leaves
other questions unanswered, and appears to create certain ambigui-
ties that will require additional litigation to resolve.
The lack of an adequate legal, legislative or administrative solu-
tion to resolve the issue of uncertainty prompts consideration of ap-
propriate alternatives. The problems of risk distribution and loss al-
location associated with automobile insurance are similar in many
respects to the problems associated with earthquake insurance. In
both instances, an apparently singular and relatively isolated event
rises to the status of a major social problem, due to the large number
of people affected and the difficulties in determining the source of the
loss.
The Keeton-O'Connell compulsory no-fault plan, provides a
unique approach that could be easily adapted to the earthquake in-
surance problem. A compulsory, no-fault plan, by its very terms,
avoids the necessity to determine and litigate issues of negligence and
causation, and instead provides basic, first-party compensation based
on the economic loss resulting from the casualty. Such an approach
would not only resolve the dilemma of uncertainty faced by insurers
and policyholders, but would be fully compatible with other propos-
als and existing methods of risk distribution. Furthermore, by shift-
ing the focus from causation to results, the compulsory approach
provides an opportunity to channel available resources into hazard
mitigation instead of litigation.
Ultimately, the burden of a natural disaster falls upon society as
a whole, and the present system is wholly inadequate to deal with
the issues of insolvency, uncertainty, and inefficiency. This proposed
program, on the other hand, makes the best use of available informa-
tion and resources, retains compatibility with planned and existing
programs, and yet is flexible enough to respond to changes as they
occur.
Jeffrey B. Hare
1984]

